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ABSTRACT 
 
Search and Offshoring in the Presence of “Animal Spirits” 
 
In this paper, we introduce two sources of unemployment in a two-factor general equilibrium 
model: search frictions and fairness considerations. We find that a binding fair-wage 
constraint increases the unskilled unemployment rate and can at the same time lead to a 
higher unemployment rate for skilled workers, as compared to an equilibrium where fairness 
considerations are absent or non-binding. Starting from a constrained equilibrium, an 
increase in the fairness parameter leads to increases in both skilled and unskilled 
unemployment. The wage of unskilled workers increases but the wage of skilled workers 
decreases. Next we allow for offshoring of unskilled jobs in our model, and we find that, as a 
result, it becomes more likely that the fair-wage constraint binds. Offshoring of unskilled jobs 
always leads to an increase in skilled wage, a decrease in skilled unemployment and an 
increase in unskilled unemployment. The presence of fairness considerations increases the 
adverse impact of offshoring on unskilled unemployment. The unskilled wage can increase or 
decrease as a result of offshoring. 
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1 Introduction
Akerlof and Shiller (2009) in their recent book explain the importance of paying attention to
“animal spirits” in understanding how economies behave. By “animal spirits,” they mean “the
thought patterns that animate people’s ideas and feelings.” Akerlof and Shiller look at various
aspects of animal spirits that impact economic decision making. According to them, fairness is
one such aspect (other aspects are confidence, corruption and antisocial behavior, money illusion
etc.) and is the aspect of “animal spirits” that can lead to unemployment. They discuss in detail
how our sense of fairness results, up to a limit, in a positive relationship between the effort we, as
workers, put in and the wage we receive relative to what we believe is “fair,” and how in turn, that
can result in the employer setting a wage above what clears the market. Obviously, this results in
unemployment. There is now a whole strand in the unemployment literature, following Akerlof and
Yellen (1990), that focuses on such fairness or fair-wage considerations. It is, however, important to
point out that in addition to fair-wage models, macroeconomists use a wide variety of other models
to explain the existence of unemployment. Prominent among them are minimum-wage models,
insider-outsider labor union models, models based on implicit contracts, search-unemployment
models and efficiency wages.1
In a fair-wage model with skilled and unskilled workers, the fairness constraint usually binds for
unskilled workers and is never binding for skilled workers (as long as a skilled worker makes more
than an unskilled worker). Thus, the model generates zero unemployment for skilled workers and a
positive rate of unemployment for unskilled workers. While surveys of managers and workers, soci-
ological studies of work environments, firm-level studies of pay structures, experiments, personnel
management textbooks etc. provide a wealth of evidence supporting the assumption or idea of a
fair-wage (see for instance Akerlof and Yellen (1990), Bewley (2005) and Howitt (2002) for a survey
of the evidence), the prediction of a “fair-wage” model, with skilled and unskilled labor, that skilled
unemployment is zero is not very realistic. According to the OECD Employment Outlook (2007),
while the unemployment rate in the US in 2006 for people with less than secondary education was
roughly 9 percent, it was 5 percent and 2.6 percent for people with upper secondary and tertiary
education, respectively. The EU unemployment rates for the same year for the same three cate-
1 In fact, the fair-wage model can be viewed as a kind of efficiency wage model.
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gories were 13, 7 and 4 percent respectively. Thus, in addition to unskilled unemployment, skilled
unemployment can be quite substantial.
In order to generate positive unemployment rates for both categories of workers and at the
same time take the strong evidence in favor of the fair-wage hypothesis seriously, we incorporate
this hypothesis into a search model of unemployment.2 Another reason for combining the two
different strands of the unemployment literature is Solow’s (1980) insight that unemployment in
the real world is caused by different sources. Moreover, we show that the two alternative sources
of unemployment we focus on, namely search frictions and the fair-wage constraint do not lead
to additively separable effects but actually interact with each other in important and interesting
ways to produce outcomes when the economy is hit by different shocks. To illustrate this point,
we perform comparative statics with respect to the fairness parameter (that measures the society’s
preference for fairness) and the economy’s stock of skilled labor, and look at the impact of offshoring.
By combining search frictions with fair-wage concerns, we obtain several new results. One of
the results, which we find quite interesting, is that introducing fairness considerations in a search
model leads not only to an increase in the unemployment of unskilled workers, a group for whom
the fair-wage constraint is binding, but can also possibly lead to an increase in the unemployment of
skilled workers, a group for whom the fair-wage constraint is not binding. The intuition here can be
explained as follows. Introducing fairness considerations (or increasing the preference for fairness)
resulting in a binding fair-wage constraint makes it more expensive to hire unskilled workers, and
therefore, less jobs are created for unskilled workers leading to increased unemployment of unskilled
workers. Since the number of unskilled workers employed is now lower, given the complementarity
between the two types of workers in production, we get a reduction in the marginal product of skilled
workers. This reduces the demand for skilled workers as well, unless it is offset by the “strategic
effect” (explained below) which causes increased hiring of skilled workers. Hence, their market
tightness and wage rate may go down and we then also get an increase in their unemployment.
2There is a very well-developed literature in macroeconomics on the search theory of unemployment. See Pissarides
(2000) for an excellent and comprehensive treatment. In addition to the vast macroeconomic literature on search
unemployment in a closed economy, it is important to note that there also exists a literature on search induced
unemployment in an open economy (e.g. Davidson, Martin and Matusz (1999), Davidson and Matusz (2004), Moore
and Ranjan (2005), Helpman and Itskhoki (2007)).
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Introducing a fairness (“fair-wage”) constraint results in a net “strategic effect” in the wage
and employment decision of firms, identified by Stole and Zweibel (1996), even if it is absent in
net terms in the unconstrained model. The “strategic effect” in our set up can be explained as
follows. In search models, wage is positively related to the market tightness, which also implies that
the labor cost (wage plus recruitment cost) is positively related to market tightness. Therefore,
the fairness constraint is likely to bind when the ratio of market tightness for skilled to unskilled
labor is high. A firm correctly anticipating a binding fair-wage constraint has an incentive to
increase the relative employment of skilled workers to reduce their marginal product to, in turn,
reduce the wage obtained through wage bargaining. Therefore, this “strategic effect” causes the
employment of skilled workers (relative to unskilled) to be higher than it would be in its absence.
In the unconstrained case (where there is no fairness constraint or the constraint does not bind),
the "strategic effects" of the relative employment of skilled labor on skilled and unskilled wage rates
are in opposite directions and cancel each other out in the determination of the wage bill. In the
constrained case, there is always a non-zero net "strategic effect" unless the production function is
such that the marginal product of skilled workers is independent of the number of skilled workers
employed (as in the case of Leontief production function).
When the “strategic effect” is weak or absent, a binding fairness constraint leads to an increase in
skilled unemployment, along with the increase in unskilled unemployment. For a marginal increase
in the degree of fairness (when the “fair-wage” constraint is binding), the “strategic effect” is of
the second order, and hence, there is always an increase in the skilled unemployment as well. Since
the unemployment rate and wage of skilled workers move in opposite directions, the skilled wage
decreases, however, the unskilled wage increases due to increased concern for fairness. What this
implies is that when we compare two countries with different degrees of concern for fairness, we
expect the country with a greater concern for fairness not only to have a higher unemployment for
unskilled workers, but also to have a higher unemployment for skilled workers.
The unemployment figures we provided earlier show that unemployment rates are higher for
Europe relative to the US for all educational attainment categories of workers. This is consistent
with our model’s prediction that an increase in the fairness parameter leads to higher unemployment
for both types of workers since, based on survey evidence of attitudes to poverty and income, one can
argue that social norms of fairness are stronger in Europe than in the US. According to calculations
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by Alesina and Glaeser (2005), based on data from the World Values Survey for the years 1983-97,
while only 29 percent of the responders from the US believe that the poor are trapped in poverty,
about 60 percent of the European responders believe this to be the case. Furthermore, only 30
percent in the US believe that luck determines income, while 54 percent in the EU believe in luck
being a determinant. Alesina and Glaeser also find that 60 percent of the Americans surveyed
believe that the poor are lazy, while only 26 percent of the EU nationals surveyed believe so.3
Finally, using the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) surveys of public opinion, Osberg
and Smeeding (2006) find in the case of the US “less concern for leveling up at the bottom of the
distribution than in other nations.” That is, there is less concern for raising the income of the poor
relative to the mean income in the US than in other countries.
Next, we find that introducing fairness considerations in a search model of unemployment also
leads to the possibility of multiple equilibria. As discussed earlier, the fair-wage constraint binds if
the market for skilled labor is tight relative to the market for unskilled labor. If firms expect the
ratio of market tightness of skilled to unskilled to be high and therefore the fair-wage constraint to
bind, they will end up hiring more skilled workers relative to unskilled workers due to the “strategic
effect” discussed earlier. This, in turn, will make the relative market tightness for skilled workers
higher creating a “self-fulfilling prophecy.” We find that the possibility of multiple equilibria exists
for intermediate levels skilled-to-unskilled labor endowment ratios. Thus, the implication here is
that, in this intermediate range of skill abundance, countries with identical preference for fairness
and with identical relative factor endowments can have different wages and unemployment rates.
Looking at the impact of a reduction in skill endowment on unemployment, we find that the
presence of a fair-wage constraint (in addition to search) amplifies the adverse effect on unskilled
unemployment. That is, the increase in unskilled unemployment is larger as a consequence of a
decrease in skill endowment when the fair-wage constraint is binding. Therefore, the fair-wage
constraint makes the impact of a decrease in skill endowment on unskilled unemployment worse.
3Alesina and Angeletos (2005) point to the fact that while the pre-tax inequality is much higher in the US than
in Europe (Gini coefficient of 38.5 as opposed to 29.1), the redistributive policies are much more extensive and
the tax structure much more progressive in the latter. They argue that "the difference in political support for
redistribution appears, rather, to reflect a difference in social perceptions regarding the fairness of market outcomes
and the underlying sources of income inequality."
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Finally, we look at the impact of offshoring on unemployment and wages in the presence of
fairness considerations and search frictions. Both in the presence and absence of fairness considera-
tions (with search frictions present in both cases), offshoring of unskilled jobs increases skilled wage,
reduces skilled unemployment and increases unskilled unemployment. The reason is that the input
produced by foreign labor in the model is a substitute for domestic unskilled labor, and through
this competitive effect, offshoring reduces the tightness in the unskilled labor market. Thus, the
cost of hiring domestic unskilled labor also goes down. Due to the complementarity between skilled
labor and the production input of domestic unskilled labor (or that produced by foreign labor),
we get an increase in the demand for skilled labor and increase in skilled-labor market tightness.
The presence of fairness considerations makes the impact of this kind of offshoring on unskilled
unemployment worse because in addition to the reduced market tightness in the unskilled labor
market coming from the direct competitive pressure from the substitutable input produced by
foreign labor, there is an indirect upward pressure on unskilled wages coming from the fact that
offshoring can convert a non-binding fairness constraint into a binding one. This can make the
impact of offshoring on the unskilled wage ambiguous. In fact, if the fair-wage constraint is binding
before and after offshoring, contrary to general perceptions, we will get an increase in the unskilled
wage as a result of offshoring (as skilled and unskilled wage will be moving in the same direction).
Finally, the fair-wage constraint also affects the amount of offshoring in equilibrium. We get more
offshoring in the presence of fair-wage considerations. Also, the extent of offshoring increases as
the society’s preference for fairness increases.
Looking at related literature, Kreickemeier and Nelson (2006) extend the Akerlof and Yellen
(1990) model to a two-sector setting to study the impact of international trade and technology
shocks on unemployment and relative wages.4 They show that trade between US and Europe, with
the preference for fairness being greater in the latter, leads to reduction in wage inequality and
increase in unemployment in the US and increase in wage inequality and reduction in unemployment
in Europe. They also analyze how trade with the newly industrializing countries (NICs) affects
wage inequality and unemployment differently in these two regions.
Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) (in subsection 2.6 of Chapter 10 of their book) compare the
Anglo-Saxon labor market with the European labor market. While search frictions with skilled and
4See also Agell and Lundborg (1995).
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unskilled workers are incorporated in both these types of markets, the European labor market also
has an endogenous minimum wage for unskilled workers that is proportional to the skilled wage,
i.e., notions of fairness and equality are incorporated into the determination of the minimum wage.
This is very similar to the concept of the fair wage that we use in this paper. However, the focus of
Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) is limited to a comparison of the effects of skill-biased technological
change on the two types of labor in the two labor markets. They assume that each type of labor
specifically produces exclusively a particular intermediate good in an industry devoted to such
production, and then there is a final good industry where the two intermediate goods are combined
to produce the final good. By separating the two types of workers to work in different firms in
different sectors, Cahuc and Zylberberg abstract from what we call in our paper “strategic effect”
and as a result do not have the "multiple-equilibria" case that we find. As well, the vast empirical
literature on the fair-wage hypothesis suggests that while the notion of "fair wage" can be based
on wage comparisons across occupations and skill types, it is hardly ever based on comparisons
across sectors. To keep the comparison between skilled and unskilled wages in the same industry to
arrive at the “fair wage”, both types of workers in our model are employed in the same firm. This
feature gives rise to the cross-factor “strategic effect” (in addition to the own “strategic effect”)
in our model, which means that not only can the employment level of one type of workers affect
the negotiated wage of that worker type, it can also affect the negotiated wage of the other kind
of workers. This is taken into account in both the firm’s maximization problem and the wage
negotiation process. In addition, the employment of both types of workers by the firms allows us to
study the implications of offshoring of the job done by one type of workers. Cahuc and Zylberberg
do not look at offshoring to which we devote a substantial part of our paper. Finally, we perform
several different types of comparative static exercises, including analysis of shocks that move us
from a situation of nonbinding to binding "fair-wage" constraint.
Another recent related paper is Grossman and Helpman (2008). In that paper, the utility
derived by a worker is increasing in her own wage but decreasing in the average wage of the firm.
This utility has to be above a threshold for the participation constraint of the worker to be satisfied.
Thus, under certain conditions, Grossman and Helpman are able to get an equilibrium where in
some firms, a large number of unskilled workers (relative to the number of skilled workers) work at
a very low wage (firm-level average wage is low) and in others, a small number of unskilled workers
6
work at very high wages (firm-level average wage is high). Since the effect of own wage and average
firm wage are in opposite directions in the worker’s utility function, the two types of firms result in
the same level of worker utility. There is no unemployment in the Grossman-Helpman model since
workers can be employed at very low wages as long as the average wage in the firm is low. In order
to get rid of inefficiencies caused by jealousies or fairness considerations, firms offshore the work
of unskilled workers in their model. The assumption driving this result is that for a multinational
firm, only the average firm wage for operations carried out within the domestic boundaries of a
country enters the domestic worker’s utility function. Again, there is no unemployment of any kind
in this case. A result in the Grossman-Helpman paper that is similar to ours is the direct positive
relationship between the strength of the preference for fair wages and the extent of offshoring, even
though the motivation for offshoring in our model is very different from theirs.
Before ending the introduction, we would like to reiterate and substantiate our earlier claim that
the effects of shocks on wages and unemployment rates in our model are not additively separable into
effects that one would see in a pure fair-wage model and a pure search model.5 By incorporating
search frictions in a fair-wage model of unemployment, not only do we trivially generate skilled
unemployment, but more substantively, identify another margin of adjustment to shocks in the
form skilled unemployment or market tightness for skilled workers. In a pure fair wage model,
the margins of adjustment are skilled wage and unskilled unemployment, therefore, the impact of
shocks on unskilled unemployment may be exaggerated and the impact on skilled unemployment
understated. For example, starting from an equilibrium where the fairness constraint binds, an
increase in the preference for fairness has no impact on the skilled unemployment in the pure fair-
wage model, but skilled unemployment increases unambiguously in the hybrid (fair wage plus search
frictions) model. Looking at the offshoring of jobs done by unskilled labor, we find that offshoring
can lead to complete unemployment of unskilled workers in a pure fair-wage model because skilled
wage rises and consequently fair wage rises to a level that makes it unprofitable for firms to employ
unskilled workers. However, in our hybrid model, skilled wage does not rise as much because a
part of adjustment takes place through a tightening of skilled labor market, resulting in lower
skilled unemployment. Thus, the increase in skilled wage, and hence, in the fair wage is less, which
5While the pure fair-wage model is worked out in the appendix, the unconstrained case in the main text is nothing
but a pure search model.
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alleviates the impact of offshoring on unskilled unemployment.
2 The Model
2.1 The Goods Market
The economy comprises three types of agents: S skilled workers, L unskilled workers, and a large
number of entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs have access to technology to produce a final good, Z,
using skilled and unskilled labor. The production function for the final good Z, which is constant
returns to scale, is given by
Z = F (εss, εll) (1)
where s and l, respectively, are the numbers of skilled and unskilled workers employed, and εs and εl
are the efforts undertaken by the two types of workers which depend on the fairness considerations
as discussed below. We also assume that the final good, Z, is the numeraire.
2.2 The Labor Market
Our description of labor market is a combination of a static version of Pissarides (2000) (along the
lines of Helpman and Itskhoki (2007)) and Akerlof and Yellen (1990). Entrepreneurs must post
vacancies to hire skilled and unskilled workers to undertake production. Once a vacancy is matched
with a worker, she is hired to work for that firm (entrepreneur). Each worker has one unit of labor
to devote to market activities, however, workers choose their effort at work, ε, where ε ∈ (0, 1].
Following Kreickemeier and Nelson (2006) we postulate the following instantaneous utility function
for a worker of type-i:
G(Ci, εi) = g(Ci) +4εi (2)
where Ci is the consumption of the final good by the worker of type-i and 4εi ≡ − |εi − εni | is the
degree of norm violation for a worker of type-i. The effort norm of worker of type-i is determined
by
εni = min(
wi
w∗i
, 1) (3)
where w∗i denotes the fair wage for a worker of type-i and wi is the actual wage paid. From the
utility function in (2) it is obvious that once a worker’s wage is set, she always chooses εi = εni
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to maximize utility. Therefore, (3) above implies that workers provide the normal level of effort,
which is set to 1, if they receive at least their fair wage.
The labor markets for both skilled and unskilled are characterized by a matching technology
that depends on the number of searchers (size of the labor force) and the number of job vacancies.
Pissarides (2000) describes the empirical support for a constant returns to scale matching function,
which is what we use in this paper.
Let ui denote the unemployment rate of factor i, θi the vacancy rate (i.e., the number of
vacancies divided by the labor force), S the economy’s endowment of skilled labor, and L the
endowment of unskilled labor. Since the model is static where all workers search for a job, and a
fraction 1 − ui of workers of type-i is matched, θi is also the measure of market tightness. Then,
we write the number of matches for each factor as constant-returns-to-scale functions as follows:
M(θsS, S) =M(θs, 1)S (4)
M(θlL,L) =M(θl, 1)L (5)
Define ms ≡ M(θsS,S)S = M(θs, 1) and ml ≡
M(θlL,L)
L = M(θl, 1) as the matching rates for
the two factors, where m0(θi) > 0. Define q(θi) ≡ miθi . The constant returns to matching implies
q0(θi) < 0. With this notation, the probability of finding a job for a searcher of type- i is θiq(θi),
and the probability of filling up a vacant job is q(θi). The former is an increasing function of market
tightness, and the latter is a decreasing function of market tightness. The number of vacancies that
a firm needs to create for it to expect to create one job at the end of the matching process is 1q(θi) .
For a large firm, by the law of large numbers the actual ratio of vacancies to jobs (matches) created
will be 1q(θi) .
We will restrict attention to the case where skilled workers would never prefer to search for an
unskilled job, even if that were possible.6 Note once again that the model is static (one-period).
The unemployment rate for each factor is given by:
ui = 1−mi = 1− θiq(θi) (6)
An entrepreneur posting vacancies must pay a recruitment cost of ci(i = s, l) units of the final
good per vacancy posted. Since a firm needs to post 1q(θi) vacancies to create one job, the vacancy
6This can be done by imposing reasonable restrictions on the parameters of production and matching functions
and on the relative factor endowments of skilled and unskilled labor.
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cost per worker employed equals ciq(θi) . Once a job is filled, the entrepreneur receives the value of
the marginal product of that factor less the factoral wage, wi, where the wage is denoted in units
of the final good.
We solve the entrepreneur’s problem in two stages. In the first stage, employment and the num-
ber of vacancies are chosen, anticipating the wages as functions of skilled and unskilled employment
(determined through bargaining in the second stage) correctly. Then given the employment levels
chosen in the first stage, the wage rate is determined by a process of bargaining between the entre-
preneur and the worker, along the lines of Stole and Zweibel (1996). A worker and her employer
bargain with each other taking into account the impact of the worker’s possible exit on wages of
other employees. In other words, we allow the possibility of renegotiation of the employer with
other employees if bargaining fails with any employee, and this feature is completely factored into
the bargaining process.7
The discussion above implies that our overall equilibrium concept is one of subgame perfect
equilibrium which is solved using backward induction. That is, taking as given the employment
chosen in the first stage, in the second stage the wages are determined through a process of simul-
taneous Stole-Zweibel bargaining between the firm and the workers. Anticipating the second stage
wage as a function of employment, the firm optimally chooses employment in the first stage.
Next, along the lines of Akerlof and Yellen (1990), we show in the appendix that a firm never
pays a wage less than the fair wage, therefore, workers always work at full effort, and there is no
loss of generality in assuming the production function given in (1) to be
Z = F (s, l) (7)
With the fair-wage constraint never binding for skilled workers (as shown later), the entrepreneur
solves the following problem in the first stage correctly anticipating the wages paid in the second
stage of skilled and unskilled employment.
Max
s,l
F (s, l)− ws(s, l)s−Max{wl(s, l), w∗l }l −
cs
q(θs)
s− cl
q(θl)
l (8)
Below we describe the wage determination in two cases: when the fairness constraint does not
bind and when it does bind.
7A special case of this, where the worker and employer have equal bargaining weights, exactly boils down to the
Shapley value solution to a cooperative, multilateral bargaining problem.
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2.3 Wage Determination
2.3.1 Unconstrained case
The first-order conditions for the optimal choices of s and l are given by
[F1(s, l)]− ws − s
∂ws
∂s
− l∂wl
∂s
=
cs
q(θs)
(9)
[F2(s, l)]−wl − s
∂ws
∂l
− l∂wl
∂l
=
cl
q(θl)
(10)
where subscripts “1” and “2” denote partial derivatives of the production function with respect to
the first and second arguments, respectively. Denote the expressions on the l.h.s in the above two
equations by Ji, i = s, l, where Ji is the surplus of the firm from hiring the marginal worker of
type-i. Assuming unemployment benefit to be zero, the bargaining weight of a worker to be β, the
bargained wage for a worker of type-i is obtained as follows.
wbi = argmax
wi
wi
βJi
1−β (11)
As mentioned earlier, a worker and her employer bargain with each other taking into account
the impact of the worker’s possible exit on wages of other employees. In other words, we allow
the possibility of renegotiation of the employer with other employees if bargaining fails with any
employee, and this feature is completely factored into the bargaining process. Using (9), (10), the
first-order conditions of the above maximization problem yields the following expressions for wages
for the two types of workers.
ws = β[F1(s, l)− s
∂ws
∂s
− l ∂wl
∂s
] (12)
wl = β[F2(s, l)− s
∂ws
∂l
− l ∂wl
∂l
] (13)
The above is a system of differential equations, where each worker’s bargained wage is a fraction of
the surplus she creates in the form of her marginal product plus the reduction in the wage bill (or
minus the increase in the wage bill) of the existing workers through her employment (relative to the
situation where she exits and wages with other workers are renegotiated). As seen from the above
differential equations, there are own as well as cross effects of skilled and unskilled employment on
wages.
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It is important to note here that if ws and wl are homogeneous of degree zero in s and l, the two
first-order conditions above result in the zero-profit condition for the firm being satisfied.8 Taking
this as an important hint in finding the solution to the above set of differential equations, we write ws
and wl as functions of s/l. Denote s/l by t. Given that F (s, l) is CRS, we can write F (s, l) = lF (t; 1).
Denote F (t; 1) by f(t) and it follows that F1(s, l) = f 0(t) and F2(s, l) = f(t)− tf 0(t).
In the appendix we show that the solutions to (12) and (13), namely bargained wage rates in
the second (bargaining) stage for any relative skilled employment, t set in the first (prior) stage-
are given by
Lemma 1: ws(t) = βf 0(t);wl(t) = β(f(t)− tf 0(t))
That is, the wages are simply a fraction β of the respective marginal products of labor. This is
despite the presence of the “strategic effect” mentioned in the introduction which are captured by
terms i∂wi∂j , for i, j = s, l in the first-order conditions (9) and (10). For example, s
∂ws
∂s captures the
effect of hiring an additional skilled worker on skilled wage. If hiring an additional skilled worker
lowers their marginal product it will reduce the Nash bargained wage that firms have to pay to
skilled workers. Therefore, the value of a skilled job to the firm would exceed the marginal product
of skilled labor due to this effect. However, an additional skilled worker also increases the marginal
product of unskilled workers which would lead to an increase in the unskilled wage (∂wl∂s > 0),
leading to a reduced value of a skilled job for the firm. For a constant returns to scale production
function, these two “strategic effects” cancel out in the determination of the wage bill. Thus, the
surplus that is shared between the worker and the firm is the worker’s marginal product and it is
shared according to their bargaining weights.
2.3.2 Constrained Case
Suppose the fair wage is w∗l , and the firm expects it to be the unskilled wage in the second stage.
Assuming that w∗l , determined in general equilibrium, is taken by the firm parametrically (as given),
the first-order conditions for the employment choice in the first stage become
8Multiplying (9) by s and (10) by l and adding we get F (s, l) = (ws+ csqs(θs) )s+ (wl +
cl
ql(θl)
)l+ s(s∂ws∂s + l
∂ws
∂l ) +
l(l ∂wl∂l + s
∂wl
∂s ). Therefore, the zero profit condition holds if s
∂ws
∂s + l
∂ws
∂l = l
∂wl
∂l + s
∂wl
∂s = 0, which always holds if if
ws and wl are homogeneous of degree zero in s and l.
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f 0(t)− ws − s
∂ws
∂s
=
cs
q(θs)
(14)
f(t)− tf 0(t)− w∗l − s
∂ws
∂l
=
cl
q(θl)
(15)
The value of an extra skilled worker for a firm is given by the l.h.s of (14). As in the unconstrained
case, if ws is homogeneous of degree zero in s and l, the two first-order conditions above result in
the zero-profit condition for the firm being satisfied. We thus write ws as a function of t = s/l.
Using Nash bargaining, as in the unconstrained case, the wage of a skilled worker is given by the
following differential equation
ws(t) = β[f
0(t)− tw0s(t)] (16)
The solution to the above differential equation is given by
ws(t) = t
− 1
β
tZ
0
x
1−β
β f 0(x)dx (17)
In the case of Cobb-Douglas production function given by
F =
sγl1−γ
γγ(1− γ)1−γ (18)
the skilled wage given in (17) takes the following simple form
ws(t) = φβf
0(t) (19)
where φ ≡ 11−(1−γ)β . Since φ > 1, it implies that the skilled wage is a greater fraction of the
marginal product of skilled workers in the constrained case than in the unconstrained case. This
happens because of the “strategic effect” mentioned earlier. Since the fair wage of unskilled workers
is determined outside the firm, an additional skilled worker does not increase the wage of unskilled
workers giving rise only to the positive “strategic effect” of reducing the wage for all employed
skilled workers in the firm. Therefore, the value of a skilled job exceeds the marginal product of
skilled labor, which is reflected in the skilled wage being a higher fraction of marginal product of
skilled labor in the case of Cobb-Douglas production function. For analytical tractability and to
obtain closed form solutions, in rest of the paper we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1: The production function for the final good is of the Cobb-Douglas form given
in (18) and hence f(t) = t
γ
γγ(1−γ)1−γ .
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Having determined wages in the constrained and unconstrained cases, we next solve for the
equilibria in the two cases.
3 Autarky Equilibrium
3.1 Unconstrained case
It is shown in the appendix that the first-order conditions (9), (10), and lemma 1 imply
Lemma 2: ws(t) = βf 0(t) =
β
1−β
cs
q(θs)
;wl(t) = β(f(t)− tf 0(t)) = β1−β
cl
q(θl)
.
The above relationships are determined by the fact that the surplus from a job-i in equilibrium
equals the hiring cost of ciq(θi) . Since the firms take θi as given, lemma 2 provides us with two
expressions for the relative demand td for a firm, both of which must be true in equilibrium.
Dividing one expression by the other we get the following expression for the relative demand td as
a function of θs and θl.
f 0(td)
f(td)− tdf 0(td) =
csq(θl)
clq(θs)
Using the functional form for f(t) given in Assumption 1, the above can be written as
td =
γ
1− γ
µ
clq(θs)
csq(θl)
¶
(20)
To obtain closed form solutions, we assume that the matching function is also of Cobb-Douglas
form given as follows.
Assumption 2: m(θi) = k(θi)δ and hence q(θi) = k(θi)δ−1.
Under the above assumption, the relative demand is decreasing in θsθl . This is shown using a
downward sloping curve denoted by RLDu in Figure 1 in (sl ,
θs
θl
) space. This is intuitive as the
relative cost of employing skilled labor (relative to unskilled) is increasing in its relative market
tightness.
Having obtained an expression for relative demand, next we derive an expression for the relative
supply of two types of labor. Denoting the economy’s endowments of skilled and unskilled labor
by S and L respectively, the relative supply (available for employment) is given by S(1−us)L(1−ul) , which
using (6) becomes
ts =
Sθsq(θs)
Lθlq(θl)
=
S
L
µ
θs
θl
¶δ
(21)
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where the last equality follows from the functional form for the matching function given in As-
sumption 2. The above is clearly increasing in θsθl . In other words, because the relative employment
rate is increasing in the relative market tightness of skilled labor (through the Beveridge curve
relationship between the unemployment rate and labor market tightness), the relative supply of
skilled labor available for employment is also increasing in its relative market tightness.
The intersection of the downward sloping relative demand with the upward sloping relative
supply determines the autarky equilibrium in the unconstrained case as shown in Figure 1. The
unconstrained equilibrium θsθl and t are given by
θs
θl
=
clγL
cs(1− γ)S
; t =
µ
γcl
(1− γ)cs
¶δ µL
S
¶δ−1
(22)
The corresponding equilibrium values of ws, wl, θs, and θl are obtained as follows. As mentioned
earlier, when both (9) and (10) are satisfied, firms make zero profits. From the two expressions in
lemma 2, which are derived from the two first-order conditions (9) and (10), we get the following
zero profit condition
1
1− β
µ
cs
q(θs)
¶γ µ cl
q(θl)
¶1−γ
= 1 (23)
The above simply states that to maintain zero profits in equilibrium, an increase in θs must be
associated with a decrease in θl, and vice-versa. This negative relationship between θs, and θl is
plotted in Figure 2 and denoted by ZPCu. Once we know the equilibrium θsθl from (22), we can
determine the equilibrium values of θs, and θl from ZPCu, and the corresponding wi from lemma
2. Denote the unconstrained equilibrium wage and market tightness variables by wul , w
u
s , θ
u
l , θ
u
s .
3.2 Constrained case
The fair-wage constraint in our model arises from social norms about the maximum permissible
wage inequality. Akerlof and Yellen (1990) model fair wage for type-i as a linear combination of
the wage of the other type and the market clearing wage for type-i. Given the search friction and
wage bargaining, there is no market clearing wage in our framework. In principle, we could use the
unconstrained bargained wage in place of the market clearing wage, that is we could use a fair-wage
specification as follows.
w∗l = τws + (1− τ)wul (24)
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where wul is the unconstrained equilibrium fair wage. Without loss of generality, and to simplify
the exposition considerably, we assume that our fair wage, w∗l , takes the following simple form
Assumption 3: w∗l = τws
Now, there are two possibilities: either the fair-wage constraint does not bind (wul > τw
u
s ) or it
does bind. Therefore, the expression for the unskilled wage is given by
wl =Max{wul , τwcs}
where wcs is the equilibrium skilled wage in the case where the wage of unskilled workers is con-
strained to be equal to its fair wage.9
When the fair-wage constraint binds, the constrained relative demand as a function of θsθl is
derived as follows. Re-write (14) and (15) using (16) and (19) as
ws(t) = φβf
0(t) =
β
1− β
cs
q(θs)
(25)
f(t)− tf 0(t) + t2w0s(t) = f(t)− φtf 0(t) = w∗l +
cl
q(θl)
(26)
Dividing (25) by (26) we get
φβf 0(t)
f(t)− φtf 0(t) =
β
1−β
cs
q(θs)
w∗l +
cl
q(θl)
(27)
which upon using the functional form of f(t) yields
td =
γ(w∗l +
cl
q(θl)
)
(1− γ) csq(θs)
(28)
The above is the relative demand for a firm taking w∗l , θl, and θs as given. Comparing the above
relative demand with the one in the unconstrained case given in (20) note that for any given θl
and θs, the constrained relative demand for skilled labor is higher. This is due to the “strategic
effect” mentioned earlier. Hiring an extra skilled worker lowers the wages of all skilled workers, and
therefore, firms have an incentive to hire more skilled workers than in the unconstrained case. Also,
hiring an additional unskilled worker increases the skilled wage, therefore, firms want to reduce the
hiring of unskilled workers. Both these effects tend to increase the relative demand for skilled
workers in the constrained case.
9We can also have exactly the same fair-wage constraint for skilled workers in terms of the unskilled wage.
However, as long as the skilled wage is greater than unskilled wage (which is assumed to be true throughout by
choice of parameters), it is obvious that the constraint is never binding for skilled workers.
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If the fair wage w∗l were exogenous, say a policy determined minimum wage, then we would use
(21) and (28) to determine the equilibrium values of θl, and θs. Using the fair wage specified in
assumption 3, the equation for the relative demand becomes
td =
γ(τws(t) +
cl
q(θl)
)
(1− γ) csq(θs)
(29)
To obtain a simplified expression for relative demand, we use the following lemma which is proved
in the appendix.
Lemma 3: ws(t) =
β
1−β
cs
q(θs)
holds even in the constrained case.
The reason that the expression for the skilled wage as function of θs is unchanged from the
expression in lemma 2 for the unconstrained case is the following. Nash bargaining implies that
the skilled wage, ws equals
β
1−βJs, where Js is the surplus of the firm from hiring the marginal
skilled worker. Note from (9) and (14) that, for any given market tightness that the firms and
workers take as given, the interaction between a firm and its workers it decides to hire (through its
employment decision and wage bargaining) always results in an outcome in which Js must equal
the recruitment cost of hiring an additional worker, csq(θs) .
Using lemma 3 to substitute out ws(t) in (29) we get
td =
γ
(1− γ)
µ
τβ
1− β +
clq(θs)
csq(θl)
¶
(30)
The relative demand above is decreasing in θsθl . Comparing (20) and (30) it is easy to see that the
constrained relative demand RLDc in Figure 2 lies to the right of the unconstrained demand RLDu
when the constraint is binding. The relative supply curve, which is an increasing function of θsθl ,
remains unchanged. Therefore, the equilibrium values of θsθl and t are higher in the constrained
case (with the constraint binding) compared to the unconstrained case.
To obtain the equilibrium values of θl, θs, and ws in the constrained case, we again make use of
the two first-order conditions (25) and (26) to eliminate t to get our zero profit condition in terms
of θl and θs given by
1
(1− β)φ
µ
cs
q(θs)
¶γ µµ τβ
1− β
¶µ
cs
q(θs)
¶
+
cl
q(θl)
¶1−γ
= 1 (31)
The above is again a negative relationship between θl, and θs, which yields equilibrium values
of θl, and θs for an equilibrium θsθl . It is shown in the appendix that, in the range of
θs
θl
for which
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the constraint is binding, the curve representing (31) lies to the left of (23) in Figure 2. Intuitively,
for any θl and θs satisfying (23), the introduction of a binding fairness constraint increases the cost
of hiring unskilled labor without affecting the cost of hiring skilled labor. Therefore, firms start
making losses. To restore zero profits, θl must be lower for each θs and vice-versa.
Below we derive the range of θsθl in which the constraint is binding.
3.3 When does the constraint bind?
The constraint binds when wul < τw
u
s . From lemma 2 the constraint binds if
cl
q(θul )
< τ
cs
q(θus )
which upon using q(θ) = kθδ−1 from assumption 2 becomesµ
θus
θul
¶
>
µ
cl
τcs
¶ 1
1−δ
(32)
Thus, the relative demand curve with the possibility of the fair-wage constraint becomes the one
denoted by RLDc in Figure 1 which has two segments, one for values of θsθl greater than
³
cl
τcs
´ 1
1−δ
,
and the other for values below it which corresponds to the unconstrained relative demand curve.
Given the shape of the relative demand curve with fair-wage constraint, it is possible to get
multiple equilibria. To see this, suppose the relative supply curve is one denoted by RLS0 in Figure
1. Now, if the society did not have any concern for fairness, then the equilibrium would be at
e3. However, fairness concerns cause a stepward shift in the relative demand curve making e4 a
candidate for equilibrium as well. That is, both e3 and e4 are possible equilibria when fairness
considerations are present.
The intuition for “multiple equilibria” here is the following. Since the relative cost of labor
(wage plus recruitment cost) is positively related to the relative market tightness, the fair-wage
constraint binds if θsθl is high. If firms expect
θs
θl
to be high and therefore the fair-wage constraint to
bind, they will end up hiring more skilled workers relative to unskilled workers due to the “strategic
effect” discussed earlier. This, in turn, will make the relative market tightness for skilled workers
higher creating a “self-fulfilling prophecy.” Similarly, if θsθl is expected to be low, the fair-wage
constraint is then not expected to bind, the relative demand for skilled labor is lower, which in turn
leads to a low θsθl and thus, an effectively unconstrained outcome.
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As seen from Figure 1, we have multiple possible expectations regarding θsθl , when relative supply
is in the intermediate range, which happens only when the relative endowment of skilled labor is
in the intermediate range. In other words, if the relative endowment of skilled labor is very high
(low), which the firms know, they will expect the relative market tightness of skilled labor to be
always low (high).
Using (22) which gives the value of unconstrained equilibrium θsθl , the condition (32) can be
written as
τ >
µ
cl
cs
¶δ µ(1− γ)S
γL
¶1−δ
(33)
Therefore, if the condition above is satisfied, the constraint binds, and the equilibrium must be
obtained using the constrained relative demand curve. For example, in the case where cl = cs,
L = 2S, γ = δ = .5, τ must be greater than .7 for the constraint to bind.
In Figure 2, if θsθl is greater than a threshold value, the fair-wage constraint binds and for such
values the zero profit curve under the binding constraint, ZPCc is to the left of the unconstrained
one, ZPCu.
3.4 Comparing constrained and unconstrained equilibria
Let us compare the autarky equilibrium in the absence of fairness considerations given by point e1
in Figure 1 with the constrained autarky equilibrium given by point e2. Since the equilibrium θsθl is
higher in the constrained case, Figure 2 implies a lower θl and consequently a higher unemployment
rate of unskilled in the constrained case. Since the impact on θs is ambiguous, the impact on skilled
unemployment and skilled wage is ambiguous. Since the impact on skilled wage is ambiguous, the
impact on unskilled wage is ambiguous as well.
It is shown in the appendix (section 6.6) that in the absence of the “strategic effect”, there is
an increase in skilled unemployment as well. In the absence of the “strategic effect”, a binding
fairness constraint has two effects on the demand for skilled labor. Firstly, since unskilled labor
becomes more expensive, firms substitute skilled labor for unskilled labor. Secondly, given the
complementarity between skilled and unskilled labor, lower employment of unskilled labor reduces
the marginal product of skilled labor and hence reduces the demand for skilled labor. It is shown
that, for an individual firm there is an increase in the relative demand for skilled labor at each θsθl
compared to the unconstrained case. However, at the aggregate level, the increased ratio of skilled
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to unskilled employment results in a lower marginal product of skilled labor and consequently a
lower market tightness for skilled labor. Lower market tightness for skilled labor implies lower
skilled wage and higher skilled unemployment. Given that the the ratio of skilled to unskilled
employment is higher, the marginal product of unskilled labor is higher. With a lower recruitment
cost per unskilled worker due to a lower market tightness in the constrained equilibrium, this higher
marginal product implies a higher unskilled wage. The result is summarized below.
Proposition 1: In a constrained equilibrium where w∗l ≥ wul , unskilled unemployment is higher
and skilled unemployment (and skilled wage) may be higher or lower compared to an unconstrained
equilibrium. If the “strategic effect” in employment choice is absent (as is the case with a Leontief
production function), then skilled unemployment is higher as well and while skilled wage is lower,
the unskilled wage is higher.
The proposition above highlights the importance of the “strategic effect” in determining the
impact of fair-wage considerations on skilled unemployment. When the constraint is binding, the
possibility of paying a lower wage to skilled workers in the second stage (first stage employment
choice determines marginal product, and hence wage through wage bargaining in the second stage)
induces firms to hire more skilled workers (and fewer unskilled workers) in the first stage which
reduces skilled unemployment (and increases unskilled unemployment). The strength of the “strate-
gic effect” depends on the elasticity of substitution between the two factors of production. In the
extreme case of zero elasticity of substitution (Leontief production function) the “strategic effect”
is zero as well (See appendix).
3.5 Comparative statics with respect to τ
Let us assume that the economy is at a constrained equilibrium, i.e., the relative supply curve in
Figure 1 intersects the fair-wage relative demand curve in its upper right-hand downward sloping
part (that lies above the cut-off value of θsθl at which the fairness constraint binds). An increase
in τ implies a rightward shift in the upper right-hand segment of the relative demand for skilled
labor from (30). Also, from (32), it implies a reduction in the cut-off value of θsθl at which the
fairness constraint binds. Since the relative supply remains unchanged, an increase in τ increases
the equilibrium values of θsθl and t. Since the corresponding part of the zero-profit curve shifts to
the left in Figure 2 (and the ray through the origin indicating the threshold value of θsθl rotates
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clockwise), there is an unambiguous decrease in θl. An increase in t implies from (25) a decrease in
θs as well. Decreases in ws, θs, and θl imply from (31) (and from our definition of the fair unskilled
wage) that the unskilled wage must rise. Recall that decreases in θs and θl will reduce the cost
of recruiting both types of workers, and since the skilled wage declines, the unskilled wage must
increase to restore the zero profit condition. Therefore, we get the following result.
Proposition 2: Starting from a constrained equilibrium, an increase in the fairness parameter
τ leads to increases in both skilled and unskilled unemployment. Skilled wage falls and unskilled
wage rises.
While a comparison of unconstrained and constrained equilibria yields ambiguous results on the
skilled unemployment as mentioned in proposition 1, proposition 2 shows that any increase in τ ,
starting from a constrained equilibrium, leads to an unambiguous increase in skilled unemployment.
As discussed in proposition 1, in the absence of the “strategic effect”, a move from unconstrained
to constrained equilibrium leads to an increase in skilled unemployment. However, the “strategic
effect” confounds this by providing increased incentive to hire skilled workers. Starting from a
constrained equilibrium, for an incremental increase in τ the “strategic effect” is of the second
order (the effect is present in the initial and final equilibrium, both of which are constrained and
so at least partially get canceled out when looking at the difference between the two situations),
and hence skilled unemployment increases.
3.6 Change in the relative endowment of skilled labor
It is easy to see from the discussion of autarky equilibrium in the constrained and unconstrained
cases that an increase in the relative endowment of skilled labor rotates the relative supply curve
to the right in Figure 1. This leads to a decrease in the equilibrium θsθl . From Figure 2, a decrease
in θsθl implies a decrease in θs and an increase in θl. Therefore, skilled unemployment increases
and unskilled unemployment decreases in both cases. In the unconstrained case it also leads to a
decrease in wage inequality. Since wage inequality is fixed at 1τ in the constrained case, there is no
change in wage inequality as a result of increased relative endowment of skilled labor.
Next, note from (33) that an increase in SL makes it less likely that the constraint binds.
Therefore, it is possible that an increase in SL makes a binding constraint non-binding. This is
shown in Figure 1 when the there is a rightward shift in the relative supply curve from RLS to
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RLS00. In this case, there is a decrease in wage inequality because the wage inequality decreases
from 1τ to the inverse of the expression on the r.h.s of (33).
To compare the effects of relative endowment changes in the presence and absence of fairness
considerations and to keep the initial equilibrium the same under both situations for a fair compar-
ison, let us consider the reverse case of a reduction in SL . In the presence of fairness considerations,
let us assume that the fair-wage constraint does not bind initially, which gives us the same equi-
librium as when there are no fairness considerations at all. The impact on unemployment can be
analyzed using Figures 1 and 2. In Figure 1, the initial relative supply curve is RLS00 and therefore,
the intersection with the relative demand curve is in the unconstrained part at e5, irrespective of
whether we have fairness considerations or not. After the reduction in SL the relative supply curve
moves from RLS00 to RLS. Now, there is a greater increase in the equilibrium θsθl under fairness
considerations since this reduction now makes the fair-wage condition bind. In Figure 2, the zero
profit curve now is the one corresponding to the constrained case whose relevant portion now lies
to the left of the unconstrained one. Therefore, under fairness considerations, there is a larger
reduction in θl, but the impact on θs becomes ambiguous. In other words, the increase in un-
skilled unemployment is magnified by the fact that this decrease in the skilled labor force makes
the fair-wage constraint binding.
4 Impact of offshoring
For offshoring to be possible, firms have to be able to fragment their production in such a way
that semi-finished output, whose production only requires the application of unskilled labor, can
be produced in another country (South) and then imported back to be combined with skilled labor
at home to produce the final product. To keep things simple, we assume that one unit of this
semi-finished good is a perfect substitute for a unit of domestic unskilled labor. We assume the
price of imported input inclusive of the search and trade costs as fixed, which is equivalent to a
small country assumption. (This assumption is reasonable if we believe that the South has large
quantities of unskilled labor and that fixed labor productivity in a large subsistence, numeraire
sector there fixes their unskilled wage.) Suppose the unit cost (faced at home) of offshored input
is pm.
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Let the amount of this input imported be denoted by m. As far as the timing of offshoring
is concerned, we assume that the quantity of offshored input is chosen in the first stage along
with skilled labor. This assumption may be closer in spirit to the offshoring of services, while the
assumption of freely adjustable input will be closer to the case of imported intermediate good. Later
we will note the implication of allowing this input to be imported freely at any time.
A firm that decides to offshore and not hire unskilled workers domestically, solves the following
problem:
Max
s,m
F (s,m)−ws(s,m)s− pmm−
cs
q(θs)
s
The first order conditions for the above maximization are given by
[F1(s,m)]− ws − s
∂ws
∂s
=
cs
q(θs)
(34)
F2(s,m)− s
∂ws
∂m
− pm = 0 (35)
Using Nash bargaining, the wage of skilled is given by the following differential equation
ws(t) = β[f
0(t)− tw0s(t)] (36)
where t equals s/m in the offshoring case. Note from above that the problem of offshoring firms
is similar to that of firms in autarky when the fairness constraint binds. Therefore, the solution
to (36), when f(t) is one given in assumption 1, is ws(t) = φβf 0(t) where φ ≡ 11−(1−γ)β . As well,
since lemma 3 still holds for offshoring firms: ws(t) = φβf 0(t) =
β
1−β
cs
q(θs)
. For non-offshoring firms,
either lemma 2 or lemma 3 will hold depending on whether the fairness constraint binds or not. In
either case the equilibrium wage of skilled workers is going to equal β1−β
cs
q(θs)
. That is, the offshoring
and non-offshoring firms will end up paying the same wage to the skilled workers.
Ruling out the case of fair-wage constraint binding before but not after offshoring (as shown
in the appendix), we discuss three possible cases of offshoring: 1) the fairness constraint does
not bind before and after offshoring; 2) it does not bind before but binds after offshoring; 3) it
binds before and after offshoring. Note that in the post-offshoring equilibrium the issue of fairness
constraint binding or not binding is applicable only for firms that are not offshoring or sourcing
their production input domestically.
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To analyze the impact of offshoring on wage and unemployment we make use of the zero profit
conditions in (23) and (31) which in turn are based on the firms’ optimization exercises in the
unconstrained and constrained cases, respectively. Analogous to the derivation of (31), using the two
first-order conditions (34) and (35), we derive the following zero profit condition for the offshoring
firm
1
(1− β)φ
µ
cs
q(θs)
¶γ
(pm)
1−γ = 1 (37)
We analyze here the different possible cases as follows:
4.1 Case 1: Fairness constraint non-binding before and after offshoring
This case also isolates the impact of offshoring on unemployment when unemployment is caused
only by search frictions and there are no fairness considerations, and hence serves as a benchmark
for considering the issues arising out of fairness considerations.
Denote the autarky values of variables with a superscript A and the post-offshoring values with
a superscript o. Recall that the autarky zero profit condition (23) can be written using superscript
A as
1
1− β
µ
cs
q(θAs )
¶γ µ cl
q(θAl )
¶1−γ
= 1 (38)
At the autarky values of θAs and θ
A
l , in order for a firm to be induced to offshore, it should make a
positive profit from offshoring. Using (37) we can write this condition as
1
(1− β)φ
µ
cs
q(θAs )
¶γ
(pm)
1−γ < 1 (39)
Therefore, starting from autarky, in order for any firm to want to offshore, it must be the case that
p1−γm
φ
<
µ
cl
q(θAl )
¶1−γ
(40)
That is, for a given pm, the higher the θAl , the greater the likelihood of offshoring.
In the post-offshoring equilibrium, the zero profit condition of an offshoring firm derived in (37)
can be written using subscript o as
1
(1− β)φ
µ
cs
q(θos)
¶γ
(pm)
1−γ = 1 (41)
while the zero profit condition for a non-offshoring firm is given by
1
1− β
µ
cs
q(θos)
¶γ µ cl
q(θol )
¶1−γ
= 1 (42)
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Since firms must be indifferent between offshoring and non-offshoring, (41) and (42) imply
p1−γm
φ
=
µ
cl
q(θol )
¶1−γ
(43)
Conditions (40) and (43) together imply that θol < θ
A
l . This implies from lemma 2 that the unskilled
wage falls and the unskilled unemployment rises due to offshoring. By comparing the zero profit
conditions of non-offshoring firms in the pre and post offshoring equilibriums ((38) and (42)) note
that θol < θ
A
l implies θ
o
s > θ
A
s , thus, the skilled wage rises, and skilled unemployment falls. There
is a rise in wage inequality as well since the skilled wage rises and the unskilled wage falls.
Note that the cost of hiring a unit of unskilled labor for non-offshoring firms is wol +
cl
q(θol )
, which
from lemma 2 equals 11−β
cl
q(θol )
. Therefore, (43) can be re-written as
p1−γm = φ(1− β)1−γ
µ
wol +
cl
q(θol )
¶1−γ
Since φ(1− β)1−γ < 1, the above implies that pm < wol +
cl
q(θol )
in an offshoring equilibrium. That
is, there is a wedge between the cost of domestic unskilled labor and the price at which the input
is offshored. Since firms are wage setters in the model, they value the marginal worker not only for
her marginal product but also for her impact on the wage bill. An extra unskilled worker lowers
the marginal product of an unskilled worker and therefore, when firms can control the unskilled
wage through employment, the wage of existing unskilled workers goes down. This monopsony
power is valued by firms and to keep this monopsony power, they are willing to bear a higher cost
of domestic unskilled labor compared to the cost of offshoring the production input. Algebraically,
note from (35) that F2(s,m) = pm − t2w0s(t), and since w0s(t) < 0, the marginal expenditure by a
firm on a unit of offshored input exceeds pm because offshored input increases the marginal product
of domestic skilled labor and hence their wage through Nash bargaining.
4.2 Case 2: Constraint non-binding before and binding after offshoring
Since the fairness constraint is not binding in autarky, starting from autarky, in order for a firm
to offshore, condition (40) must be satisfied. The zero profit condition of offshoring firms is again
given by (41). Since the fairness constraint is binding in the post-offshoring equilibrium, the zero
profit condition of non-offshoring firms, obtained in (31) can be written using superscript o as
1
(1− β)φ
µ
cs
q(θos)
¶γ µµ τβ
1− β
¶µ
cs
q(θos)
¶
+
cl
q(θol )
¶1−γ
= 1 (44)
25
Now, (41) and (44) imply pm = wol +
cl
q(θol )
=
³
τβ
1−β
´³
cs
q(θos)
´
+ clq(θol )
. This along with (40) implies
wAl +
cl
q(θAl )
> wol +
cl
q(θol )
. That is, the cost of hiring unskilled labor is lower in the post-offshoring
equilibrium.
Next, (38), (40), and (41) imply that θos > θ
A
s , which in turn implies that the post-offshoring
skilled wage is higher and unemployment lower than in autarky: wos > w
A
s , u
o
s < u
A
s .
Since the fair-wage constraint did not bind in autarky, it must be the case that wAl > τw
A
s in the
autarky unconstrained equilibrium. Since wos > w
A
s , the unskilled fair wage in the post-offshoring
equilibrium, τwos, is higher than τw
A
s . Therefore, it is possible for post-offshoring unskilled wage to
be higher than the autarky unskilled wage. However, the post-offshoring unskilled unemployment
must be higher than the autarky unemployment as is shown below.
Lemma 4: When offshoring converts a nonbinding fair-wage constraint into a binding one, it
must be the case that θol < θ
A
l (Proof in appendix).
To understand the intuition behind this lemma, note first that since the fairness constraint is
binding in the post-offshoring equilibrium, there is no wedge between the cost of domestic unskilled
labor and the cost of offshoring the input: pm = wol +
cl
q(θol )
. A binding fairness constraint implies
the absence of monopsony power vis-a-vis unskilled workers, and hence there cannot be a wedge.
Secondly, note that the cost of hiring (wage plus vacancy cost) a unit of unskilled labor under
autarky has to be higher than the cost of offshoring the input for offshoring to actually take
place (This is a necessary condition). Given that in the offshoring equilibrium domestic unskilled
labor and offshored imported input are perfect substitutes, the latter exerts downward competitive
pressure on the domestic unskilled labor market. This downward pressure on unskilled labor market
tightness is further accentuated by the fact that the fair-wage constraint is binding and a higher
wage will have to be paid in comparison to what unskilled workers would have been paid in the
absence of such a constraint.
One of the things that clearly emerges from this analysis is that offshoring makes it more likely
that the fairness constraint will bind. In other words, the cutoff value of τ above which the fairness
constraint binds is lower under offshoring.
Cases 1 and 2 also allow us to compare the effects of offshoring in the absence and presence
of the fair-wage constraint. The autarky equilibria under the two regimes are the same when,
under fairness considerations, the fair-wage constraint is not binding in autarky. Essentially, we are
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comparing the post-offshoring outcomes in cases 1 and 2 above. Note that the zero profit condition
of offshoring firms is given by (41) in both cases, while for non-offshoring firms it is given by (42)
if the constraint does not bind, and (44) if the constraint does bind. Using superscripts u and c
to denote the variables in the unconstrained and constrained cases, respectively, it can be easily
verified from (41), (42), and (44) that (θos)
u = (θos)
c and (θol )
u > (θol )
c . The former implies that
skilled wage and unemployment remain unchanged in the offshoring equilibrium if the constraint
binds. However, the unskilled unemployment is higher in the latter case. Finally, the unskilled
wage, given by τwos , is higher in the constrained case.
4.3 Case 3: Constraint binding before and after offshoring
The results for this case are formally derived in the appendix, but are intuitively explained here as
follows. Since there is a net strategic effect (but no strategic effect to be exercised on unskilled wage
or cost of the imported input) for firms wanting to offshore as well as those wanting to produce the
input domestically (employ domestic unskilled labor), there is no “wedge” between domestic labor
costs (wage plus vacancy costs) and the cost of offshoring the production input. Offshoring here
pushes down the cost of hiring domestic unskilled labor (wage plus vacancy costs). The reason is
that domestic unskilled labor comes in direct competition with the imported input that is a perfect
substitute for it in the offshoring equilibrium. In the offshoring equilibrium, we know that a firm
will be indifferent between offshoring the production input and producing it domestically using
domestic unskilled labor. Given the zero-profit condition of the final good Z, the lower domestic
cost of an unskilled worker allows for a higher labor cost and therefore a higher market tightness
for skilled workers. Thus skilled unemployment is lower and skilled wages are higher. Since the
unskilled wage is proportional to skilled wage by the fair-wage condition, unskilled wages are also
higher. Given that the cost of hiring (wage plus vacancy costs) an unskilled worker has gone down,
this means that the vacancy cost per worker hired has gone down (unskilled labor market tightness
has gone down). Therefore, unskilled unemployment has gone up.
We summarize the result on offshoring in the proposition below.
Proposition 3: Irrespective of the fairness constraint, offshoring leads to an increase in skilled
wage and a decrease in skilled unemployment. As well, there is an unambiguous increase in unskilled
unemployment. If the constraint does not bind before or after offshoring, then the unskilled wage
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decreases unambiguously. If the constraint binds both before and after offshoring, then the unskilled
wage increases unambiguously. Even if the constraint is not binding in autarky, it may become
binding upon offshoring. In this case, the impact on unskilled wage is ambiguous.
Another thing to note from the above analysis is that final unemployment rates and wages of
skilled and unskilled workers in an offshoring equilibrium are independent of the country’s relative
factor endowments and depend totally on the price of the offshored input, pm. On the other hand,
we have shown that autarky unemployment and wages depend on endowments.
4.4 Impact of an increase in τ on offshoring
In this sub-section, we want to study the impact of an increase in τ on the likelihood of offshoring,
and starting from an offshoring equilibrium, the impact of an increase in τ on the extent of off-
shoring. From proposition 2 we know that in autarky: dθ
A
s
dτ < 0,
dθAl
dτ < 0. Let us use the following
notational simplification in this section.
Notation: Denote ω(τ) ≡
³
τβ
1−β
´³
cs
q(θAs )
´
+ cl
q(θAl )
Using the zero profit condition in autarky when the constraint is binding given by (31) and
proposition 2, we get ω0(τ) > 0. Starting from a constrained autarky equilibrium, in order for firms
to offshore it must be the case that ω(τ) > pm. Therefore, an increase in τ makes offshoring more
likely.
Starting from an offshoring equilibrium where the fairness constraint is binding, an increase in
τ has no effect on θos as is easily verified from the zero profit condition of offshoring firms given
in (41). Therefore, there is no effect on skilled wage and unemployment. However, unskilled wage
increases because wol = τw
o
s.. Next, the zero profit condition of the non-offshoring firms given in (44)
implies that dθ
o
l
dτ < 0. That is, the effect of an increase in τ , starting from an offshoring equilibrium
is to increase unskilled wage and unskilled unemployment. As well, (41) and (44) together imply
that
³
τβ
1−β
´³
cs
q(θos)
´
+ clq(θol )
= pm, and therefore, the relative demand for skilled labor by non-
offshoring firms given in (29) is unchanged as is the relative demand s/m for offshoring firms. Since
the effective relative supply of domestic skilled labor has risen due to increased unemployment of
unskilled workers, more firms must be offshoring now. Therefore, an increase in τ leads to an
increase in offshoring.
Proposition 4: An increase in fairness parameter, τ , increases the likelihood of offshoring.
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Starting from an offshoring equilibrium where the fairness constraint is binding, an increase in
τ leads to an increase in offshoring, an increase in unskilled wage, and an increase in unskilled
unemployment, while the unemployment rate and wage of skilled workers remain unchanged.
Before ending the discussion of offshoring we note the implications of allowing the adjustment
of the imported input any time, in particular after the skilled employment has been chosen and
at the same time as (or even after) they bargain over wages with skilled workers. In this case the
optimal choice of imported input must always satisfy F2(s,m) = pm, and the equilibrium t will be
pinned down by this condition. Therefore, the strategic effect will disappear (∂ws∂s = 0), and the
first-order condition for the choice of skilled labor will become f 0(t)− ws(t) = csq(θs) , and the Nash
bargained wage will simply be ws(t) = βf 0(t). In this case, the cost of employing a unit of offshored
input equals pm. The results regarding the increase in unskilled unemployment and decline in skilled
unemployment obtain even in this case. One difference from the case when the imported input is
chosen along with the skilled wage in the first stage is that now the wedge between the price of
imported input and the cost of domestic unskilled labor obtains when the fairness constraint binds
in the post-offshoring equilibrium, while earlier it obtained when the fairness constraint did not
bind in the offshoring equilibrium.
5 Discussions and Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have introduced fairness considerations in a model of unemployment with search
frictions. The purpose is to generate positive unemployment rates for both categories of workers as
found in the macroeconomic data across countries and at the same time take the strong evidence
in favor of the fair-wage hypothesis seriously. In our model the fair-wage constraint operated at the
level of the industry. That is, the firm took it as given while deciding on its employment decision
in the first period. In models with competitive labor market such as Akerlof and Yellen (1990) or
Kreickemeier and Nelson (2006), when looking at an integrated equilibrium where both types of
labor are employed by all firms, one cannot make a distinction between the cases when the fair-wage
constraint operates at the firm level or the industry level. However, in our framework where firms
have monopsonistic power in the labor market, it is possible to make a distinction between the two
cases. If the fair wage is determined at the firm level, then a firm takes this into account while
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choosing its employment in the first stage. To be more precise, the objective function of the firm
given in (8) now becomes
Max
s,l
½
F (s, l)−ws(s, l)s−Max{wl(s, l), τws(s, l)}l −
cs
q(θs)
s− cl
q(θl)
l
¾
(45)
where w∗l has now been replaced by τws(s, l) since it is determined within the firm. As a result,
the first order condition for the optimal choice of s in the case where the constraint is expected to
bind is given by
f 0(t)− ws − s
∂ws
∂s
− lτ ∂ws
∂s
=
cs
q(θs)
(46)
Note the extra term lτ ∂ws∂s which captures the fact that any change in skilled wage affects the fair
wage as well, which is taken into account by the firm. Using the Nash bargaining as before, the
wage of the skilled workers is given by the following differential equation
ws(t) = β[f
0(t)− (t+ τ)w0s(t)] (47)
It can be verified that the solution to the above differential equation is given by
ws(t) = (t+ τ)
− 1
β
tZ
0
(x+ τ)
1−β
β f 0(x)dx (48)
Intuitively, since hiring an extra skilled worker reduces the fair wage by lowering the skilled wage,
the value of a skilled worker for a firm is higher than in the case when the fair wage is exogenous
from the firm’s point of view. A higher value of skilled worker implies a higher wage for skilled
workers as well. Therefore, the ‘strategic effect’ in the hiring of skilled workers becomes stronger
than in the case discussed earlier. Note that when the firm takes the fair wage as given, then both in
autarky in the case of offshoring, the only ‘strategic effect’ is that of skilled employment affecting
skilled wage. When the fair wage is determined inside the firm, there is an additional strategic
effect in autarky because skilled employment affects fair wage, however, it vanishes in the case of
offshoring because the firm takes the price of offshored input as given. A full fledged analysis of
the case when the fair wage is determined within the firm is left for future research.
Let us conclude here by summarizing our key findings in this paper. Firstly, we find that the
effect of search frictions and the fair-wage constraint in this encompassing model on the response
of wages, wage inequality and unemployment rates to various shocks is not additively separable.
There are important interaction effects that can be missed unless these two characteristics of the
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labor market are combined in the same model. Specifically, we find that a binding fair-wage
constraint increases the unskilled unemployment rate and can also lead to an increase in the skilled
unemployment rate as compared to an equilibrium where fairness considerations are absent or
non-binding. This is consistent with the experiences of Europe and the US.
Secondly, allowing for offshoring of unskilled jobs in our model, we find that it becomes more
likely that the fair-wage constraint binds. Offshoring always leads to an increase in skilled wage,
a decrease in skilled unemployment and an increase in unskilled unemployment. The presence of
fairness considerations increases the adverse impact of offshoring on unskilled unemployment. The
unskilled wage can increase or decrease as a result of offshoring. If the fair-wage constraint binds
both before and after offshoring, then the unskilled wage increases unambiguously.
Finally, the difference between our combined model and that of a model purely based on fairness
considerations is also important to note. It is shown in the appendix (section 6.11) that in a pure
fair-wage model there is no skilled unemployment. As a result, skilled unemployment is not affected
by shocks such as changes in the degree of fairness, changes in the relative factor endowments, or
offshoring. More importantly, while in the hybrid (search plus fair wage) model presented in
the text the adjustment to any shock takes place through changes in both skilled and unskilled
unemployment, in the fair-wage model only the unskilled unemployment adjusts which can result
in extremely high levels of unskilled unemployment. For example, we show in the appendix that in
the fair-wage model offshoring leads to complete unemployment of unskilled workers.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Firms never pay a wage less than the fair wage
Given the production function in (1) a firm maximizes
Max
s,l
F (bs,bl)− bwsbs− bwlbl − bcs
q(θs)
bs− bcl
q(θl)
bl
where bi = εii, bwi = wiεi , , i = s, l. Here ciq(θi) is the recruitment cost per efficiency unit of labor , and
θi is the market tightness in terms of efficiency units of labor. bci is clearly decreasing in the number
of efficiency units per worker if the recruitment cost per worker (irrespective of the efficiency units
provided) is constant (for given θs, θl).
We show below that paying an unskilled worker a wage equal to w∗l leaves the profits gross
of recruitment costs unchanged relative to what is obtained under a lower wage, for given total
number of efficiency units of labor, bl = εll, where l is the number of workers. If wl ≤ w∗l , then
εl =
wl
w∗l
≤ 1. Therefore, the wage per efficiency unit of labor, bwl = wlεl = w∗l , which is taken as
given by the firm. Thus, as long as the firm pays a wage of w∗l per efficiency unit of labor and hires
a fixed total of bl efficiency units of labor, its profit gross of recruitment costs remains unchanged.
The profits net of recruitment costs will be higher at per worker wage w∗l than any lower wage for
the following reason. Paying a per-worker wage of w∗l would result in each worker working at full
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efficiency. Therefore, fewer workers will be needed to provide a given number of efficiency units, bl.
Given that recruitment cost per worker is constant for given θs, θl, profits net of recruitment costs
will be higher.
Even if the recruitment cost per efficiency unit is not declining in the efficiency units per worker,
the profits will not decline and will remain unchanged. As in Akerlof and Yellen (1990), we assume
that firms have a preference for fairness if the fair wage can be provided at no cost to their profits.
Thus, firms never pay less than the fair wage.
6.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Re-write (12) and (13) as
ws(t) = β[f
0(t)− tw0s(t)− w0l(t)] (49)
wl(t) = β[f(t)− tf 0(t) + t2w0s(t) + tw0l(t)] (50)
The above is a system of differential equations in the argument t. We guess the following solution:
ws(t) = βf
0(t);wl(t) = β(f(t)− tf 0(t)), and verify that it satisfies (49)-(50).
The guessed solution implies
w0s(t) = βf
00
(t);w0l(t) = β[−tf 00(t)] (51)
Therefore, tw0s(t)+w
0
l(t) = 0, and hence (49)-(50) imply ws(t) = βf
0(t);wl(t) = β(f(t)−tf 0(t)).QED
6.3 Proof of Lemma 2
The first-order conditions in (9) and (10) can be written as
f 0(t)− ws(t)− tw0s(t)− w0l(t) =
cs
q(θs)
(52)
f(t)− tf 0(t)− wl(t) + t2w0s(t) + tw0l(t) =
cl
q(θl)
(53)
Using tw0s(t) + w
0
l(t) = 0, and ws(t) = βf
0
(t) from lemma 1 in (52) we get
ws(t) =
β
1− β
cs
q(θs)
Similarly, wl(t) =
β
1−β
cl
q(θl)
.QED.
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6.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Note that ws = φβf
0
(t). The first-order condition with respect to s given in (14) can be
re-written as
f
0
(t)− ws(t)− tw0s(t) =
cs
q(θs)
The wage determination equation is
ws(t) = β[f
0(t)− tw0s(t)]
The above two imply that
ws(t) =
β
1− β
cs
q(θs)
QED.
6.5 Constrained ZPCc lies to the left of the unconstrained ZPCu in
(θl, θs) space
Proof: Recall from the text that the two zero profit conditions are
1
1− β
µ
cs
q(θs)
¶γ µ cl
q(θl)
¶1−γ
= 1 (54)
1
(1− β)φ
µ
cs
q(θs)
¶γ µ
τ
µ
β
1− β
¶µ
cs
q(θs)
¶
+
cl
q(θl)
¶1−γ
= 1 (55)
Now, for the unconstrained case, obtain θs and θl corresponding to any θsθl from (54). Next, verify
that at this θs and θl the l.h.s. of (55) is greater than 1. To see this divide (55) by (54) to obtain
φ−1
µ
τ
µ
β
1− β
¶µ
csq(θl)
clq(θs)
¶
+ 1
¶1−γ
(56)
Now, if the constraint binds, then τ
³
cs
q(θs)
´
>
³
cl
q(θl)
´
, and therefore,
φ−1
µ
τ
µ
β
1− β
¶µ
csq(θl)
clq(θs)
¶
+ 1
¶1−γ
> φ−1
µµ
β
1− β
¶
+ 1
¶1−γ
= φ−1 (1− β)γ−1 > 1
where the last inequality is true for any 0 < β < 1, 0 < γ < 1.
35
6.6 Constrained skilled unemployment higher in the absence of
strategic effect
Proof: Note that the absence of strategic effect in wage setting in the constrained case implies
∂ws
∂s = 0. Therefore, the solution to (16) is simply ws(t) = βf
0(t). The two first-order condition
become
f 0(t) =
cs
(1− β)q(θs)
f(t)− tf 0(t) = w∗l +
cl
q(θl)
Therefore, the relative demand for skilled labor is given by
f 0(t)
f(t)− tf 0(t) =
1
1−β
cs
q(θs)
w∗l +
cl
q(θl)
The above can be re-written as
td =
γ(1− β)(w∗l +
cl
q(θl)
)
(1− γ) csq(θs)
(57)
Using w∗l = τws(t) =
τβcs
(1−β)q(θs) , the above becomes
td =
γ
(1− γ)
µ
τβ + (1− β)clq(θs)
csq(θl)
¶
In the constrained case, when (33) is satisfied, the constrained relative demand above lies to the
right of the unconstrained one, given by td = γ(1−γ)
³
clq(θs)
csq(θl)
´
, for values of θsθl >
³
cl
τcs
´ 1
1−δ where
the fair-wage constraint binds. This is simply because unskilled labor is more expensive due to
its higher wage, and hence firms economize on unskilled labor. Since the relative supply curve is
unchanged, the constrained equilibrium θsθl (when the fair-wage constraint binds) is higher than the
unconstrained one even in the absence of the strategic effect.
To find the equilibrium values of θs and θl corresponding to the equilibrium θsθl , eliminate t from
the two first-order conditions to obtainµ
1
1− β
¶γ µ cs
q(θs)
¶γ µµ τβ
1− β
¶µ
cs
q(θs)
¶
+
cl
q(θl)
¶1−γ
= 1 (58)
Again, it can be verified that the curve representing (58) above lies to the left of the unconstrained
one in (54) in (θl, θs) space for values of (θl, θs) for which the fairness constraint binds. Therefore,
the constrained equilibrium θl is still lower than the unconstrained one. Note that the skilled wage
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is given by ws(t) = βf 0(t) in both the unconstrained and constrained cases. We have already
established that the equilibrium t is higher in the constrained case. This immediately implies
that ws(t) is lower. Since ws(t) is increasing in θs, (ws(t) =
βcs
(1−β)q(θs)), θs must decrease as well.
Also, since f(t) − tf 0(t) = w∗l +
cl
q(θl)
in the constrained case and f(t) − tf 0(t) = wl + clq(θl) in the
unconstrained case, and given that we have shown that θl is lower in the constrained case, with a
higher t in the constrained case (that leads to a higher f(t) − tf 0(t)), unskilled wage is higher in
the constrained case. Q.E.D
6.7 Leontief Case
The production function is Leontief, but matching functions remain Cobb-Douglas as above.
Wage determination
F (s, l) = min(ϕs, l). In this case when ϕs > l,MPL = ∞ and MPS = 0, while if ϕs < l,
we have MPL = 0 and MPS = ∞. To have a well-defined bargaining problem in the second
stage, our bargaining set should be bounded and therefore, we assume that there is an upper bound
(constant) on skilled and unskilled wages, given by ws and wl that can be paid. It is easy to see
that the following will be a bargaining solution that satisfies the Stole-Zweibel intrafirm bargaining
conditions:
Unconstrained case: When ϕs > l, wl = wl and ws = 0, while if ϕs < l, we have wl = 0 and
ws = ws.
Constrained case: wl = w∗l . When ϕs > l, ws = 0, while if ϕs < l, we have ws = ws.
Equilibrium
When faced with these wage functions, the firm will always set ϕs = l in the first stage. In
other words, sl is always set to
1
ϕ .
Thus, the strategic effect is completely absent in the Leontief case.
6.8 Ruling out the case of fair-wage constraint binding before but not after
offshoring
From the analysis done in Case 1 in the text, it is clear that in the absence of any fair-wage
considerations (equivalent to the case where the fairness constraint never binds), the relative wage
goes up after offshoring:
³
wos
wol
´u
>
³
wAs
wAl
´u
where superscript u denotes the unconstrained case. Now
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if the fairness constraint is binding in autarky, then
³
wAs
wAl
´u
> 1τ , and therefore,
³
wos
wol
´u
> 1τ , that
is, the constraint must bind in the post-offshoring equilibrium. Therefore, this case can be ruled
out as a possibility.
6.9 Proof of Lemma 4.
Proof: Suppose not. Suppose θol > θ
A
l . This implies that the unconstrained unskilled wage corre-
sponding to θol , denoted by ewol is greater than wAl . Since the constrained unskilled wage wol > ewol
by definition, wol > w
A
l , and hence, w
A
l +
cl
q(θAl )
< wol +
cl
q(θol )
, which is a contradiction.Q.E.D.
6.10 Derivation of results for case 3 under offshoring: Fairness constraint bind-
ing before and after offshoring
If the fairness constraint binds in autarky, the zero profit condition is
1
(1− β)φ
µ
cs
q(θAs )
¶γ µµ τβ
1− β
¶µ
cs
q(θAs )
¶
+
cl
q(θAl )
¶1−γ
= 1 (59)
Given the zero profit condition of offshoring firms in (41), starting from autarky equilibrium, in
order for offshoring to be profitable, it must be the case thatµ
τβ
1− β
¶µ
cs
q(θAs )
¶
+
cl
q(θAl )
> pm (60)
In the post-offshoring equilibrium the zero profit condition of the offshoring firms is given by (41),
while that of non-offshoring firms is given by (44). The two together imply that
pm = w
o
l +
cl
q(θol )
=
µ
τβ
1− β
¶µ
cs
q(θos)
¶
+
cl
q(θol )
(61)
This immediately implies from (60) thatµ
τβ
1− β
¶µ
cs
q(θos)
¶
+
cl
q(θol )
<
µ
τβ
1− β
¶µ
cs
q(θAs )
¶
+
cl
q(θAl )
(62)
Next, (44) and (59) imply that θos > θ
A
s , and consequently, w
o
s > w
A
l . Therefore, skilled wage
increases and skilled unemployment decreases compared to autarky. Since the fairness constraint
binds, unskilled wage, wol = τw
o
s > w
A
l = τw
A
s . Since the unskilled wage increases while the
unskilled labor cost decreases as shown in (62), θl must decrease. Therefore, both unskilled wage
and unskilled unemployment increase unambiguously.
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6.11 Outcomes in the standard fair-wage model
The firm’s maximization problem can be written as:
Max
s,l
sγl1−γ
γγ(1− γ)1−γ −wss−Max{wl, w
∗
l }l − css− cll (63)
where ci is a constant recruitment cost per worker of type i = s, l. Since there is no search for
workers, recruitment cost does not depend on market tightness in this case (Every vacancy posted
is filled with probability, q = 1).
6.11.1 Fair-wage constraint does not bind (same as the unconstrained case) under
autarky
Assuming that firms decide on employment given market wages, the first-order conditions of the
firm’s maximization problem are:
£
γγ(1− γ)1−γ
¤−1
γsγ−1l1−γ = ws + cs;
£
γγ(1− γ)1−γ
¤−1
(1− γ)sγl−γ = wl + cl (64)
Dividing one first-order condition by the other we can solve for relative labor demand as follows:
s
l
=
γ
1− γ
∙
wl + cl
ws + cs
¸
(65)
The two first order conditions, with some manipulation, give us the zero profit condition as
follows:
(ws + cs)
γ (wl + cl)
1−γ = 1 (66)
The relative factor demand equals relative factor supply, which is written as
s
l
=
S
L
⇒ γ
1− γ
∙
wl + cl
ws + cs
¸
=
S
L
⇒
∙
wl + cl
ws + cs
¸
=
1− γ
γ
S
L
. (67)
Plugging this into our zero profit condition, we can get our unconstrained solutions as wus =³
1−γ
γ
S
L
´γ−1
− cs and wul =
³
1−γ
γ
S
L
´γ
− cl. Thus, wus is decreasing in SL and wul is increasing in
it. Wages of skilled and unskilled labor are inversely related to their respective recruitment costs.
There is no unemployment.
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6.11.2 Fair-wage constraint is binding (constrained equilibrium), under autarky
We will have similar first-order conditions as in unconstrained (or non-binding) case. Only wl gets
replaced by the fair-wage w∗l . Dividing one first-order condition by the other and rearranging terms
and plugging our original fair-wage relation w∗l = τws, we can get the labor demand as
s
l
=
γ
1− γ
∙
τws + cl
ws + cs
¸
(68)
The zero-profit condition can be written as
(ws + cs)
γ (τws + cl)
1−γ = 1 (69)
For given τ , the zero-profit condition above solves for the constrained equilibrium skilled wage wcs.
Since the left-hand side of the zero-profit condition is increasing in both ws and τ , it is clear that
wcs is decreasing in τ , and if that is so the constrained unskilled wage τw
c
s is increasing in τ (to keep
the left-hand side equal to unity). Thus, relative labor demand, sl =
γ
1−γ
h
τwcs+cl
wcs+cs
i
is increasing in
τ since the numerator is increasing and the denominator is decreasing in τ . Skilled labor here is
fully employed since their wages are fully flexible. Therefore, we have sl =
γ
1−γ
h
τwcs+cl
wcs+cs
i
= SL(1−ul)
where ul is the unemployment rate of unskilled labor. Since the equilibrium relative labor demand,
γ
1−γ
h
τwcs+cl
wcs+cs
i
goes up as a result of an increase in τ , (1 − ul) has to go down,i.e., ul has to go up.
Skilled unemployment will always be zero. Note that equilibrium skilled wage and hence equilibrium
relative demand do not depend on the economy’s labor endowments. Thus, an increase in S or a
reduction in L will require a reduction in ul forsl =
S
L(1−ul) to hold (as skilled labor will always be
fully employed).
When does the fair-wage constraint bind? From the above, we can also see that the fair-
wage constraint will bind when τwus > w
u
l . This, from the expressions for unconstrained wages, can
be written as
τ
"µ
1− γ
γ
S
L
¶γ−1
− cs
#
>
µ
1− γ
γ
S
L
¶γ
− cl (70)
The right-hand side of this inequality is increasing in SL and the left-hand side is decreasing in it
but increasing in τ . Thus, the likelihood that the constraint binds decreases with SL and increases
with τ .
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As we move from an unconstrained to a constrained equilibrium due to an increase in τ , skilled
unemployment remains at zero, unskilled unemployment increases from zero to a positive value,
skilled wages fall and the unskilled wage rises because sl increases.
6.11.3 Offshoring in the pure fair-wage model
Finally, we can look at the case of offshoring. In an offshoring equilibrium, the following equation
(zero-profit condition) will hold for firms that offshore:
(wos + cs)
γ p1−γm = 1 (71)
where superscript o stands for offshoring. This fixes ws in the offshoring equilibrium. Offshoring
will take place only if wAl + cl > pm, where superscript A stands for autarky. Clearly in that case
ws will go up after offshoring. Starting from a constrained autarky equilibrium, can we have an
offshoring equilibrium where some firms offshore and others hire domestic unskilled workers? For
the latter firms, the zero profit condition will be
(wos + cs)
γ (wol + cl)
1−γ = 1 (72)
Therefore, pm = wol + cl. If the fair-wage constraint is binding in autarky, then the unskilled wage
is τwAs , and hence τw
A
s + cl > pm = w
o
l + cl. That is, τw
A
s > w
o
l . We also know that w
o
s > w
A
s .
Therefore, wol < τw
o
s.
Thus, unskilled workers can be hired in an offshoring equilibrium only if their wage, wol , is less
than the fair wage, τwos. However, at a wage less than the fair wage, unskilled do not put in full
effort, and therefore, firms do not hire them. In other words, the unskilled unemployment rate will
be 100%. Offshoring leads to a huge increase in unemployment.
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Figure 2: Zero profit conditions
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